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THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF JOINT
CUSTODY IN MONTANA
Dale R. Mrkich
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana law provides that custody of minor children can be
awarded to both parents in a final decree of dissolution.1 Custody
arrangements which recognize equal custody rights and responsi-
bilities in both parents are called "joint custody" arrangements.2
Joint custody was originally offered as an additional alternative to
traditional custody arrangements which specified the rights of par-
ents after a dissolution of marriage.3 Before joint custody, courts
had traditionally granted sole custody to one parent and visitation
to the other." Joint custody was intended to supplement but not
completely replace traditional arrangements.'
Ideally, joint custody allows children of divorced parents to
enjoy the benefits of a de facto nuclear family. The Montana leg-
islature has attempted to realize this ideal by declaring that the
public policy of joint custody in Montana is, "to assure minor chil-
dren frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to en-
courage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child
rearing."'7 To implement this policy the Montana legislature has
allowed courts to award joint or separate custody in disputes in-
volving both parents of a minor child. Both sole and joint custody
awards remain subject to the best interests of the child.' For joint
custody, however, the legislature has allowed a presumption that,
if one or both divorced parents apply for joint custody, it is in the
best interests of the child for the court to award joint custody.'
The benefits of joint custody have proven difficult to realize.
Joint custody has not enabled divorced parents to maintain a nu-
clear family by legislative fiat. Furthermore, the statutory pre-
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-223 (1985).
2. Courts and agencies in Montana and elsewhere use different names to describe
child custody arrangements other than custody to one parent and visitation to the other.
See generally Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 359-61 (1979).
3. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 280-88 (1978-79).
4. Miller, supra note 2, at 350.
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211 to -221 control traditional sole custody arrangements.
6. Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 523, 536-39 (1979). See also Miller, supra note 2, at 363.
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-222 (1985).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-223 (1985).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224(1) (1985).
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sumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child
whenever one parent applies for it creates significant problems for
courts trying to award custody in the child's best interests. Courts
cannot favor joint custody because of a statutory presumption and
still guarantee that the best interests of the child will be served.' 0
Joint custody cannot replace sole custody and visitation for all cus-
tody awards. Indeed, joint custody has not even proved a guaran-
tor of equal parental rights like proponents predicted.
This comment analyzes current Montana statutes and cases as
they have developed the concept of joint custody. It criticizes
Montana's joint custody statutes because they include a presump-
tion which could hold unacceptable and potentially dangerous con-
sequences for some divorced parents and children. The comment
concludes with recommendations for attorneys, the 1987 Montana
Legislature, and the Montana Supreme Court.
II. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AFTER DIVORCE
A. Background
Custody arrangements for minor children of divorced parents
have long created thorny problems for lawyers and judges, vindic-
tiveness and misery for parents dissolving their marriages, and
trauma and uncertainty for children. If divorce means the end of a
traditional two-parent family,1 then the parent who retains cus-
tody becomes especially important to the children. The custodial
parent will continue to influence their everyday lives without sub-
stantial contribution from a non-custodial parent.
Historically, courts recognized a father's natural right to the
custody of his children. At common law, a father's right to custody
was recognized as a property right."2 That is, fathers had a right to
the value of their children's services.' 3 Later, courts recognized a
father's right to custody based on his reciprocal responsibility to
support his children financially. In People ex rel. Nickerson, New
York Supreme Court Chief Justice Nelson stated in 1837:
In this country, the hopes of the child in respect to its education
10. Despite the statutory presumption, the standard for awarding joint custody is
whether it is in the best interests of the child. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1985).
11. Folberg & Graham note that "divorce does not end relationships in post-divorce
families, it changes them." Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 552. However, divorce often
ends families of two natural parents and their children.
12. The notion of paternal supremacy was based in Roman law and persisted in An-
glo-American common law. See Miller, supra note 2, at 351. See also Folberg & Graham,
supra note 6, at 530-36.
13. Taussig & Carpenter, Joint Custody, 56 N.D. L. REV. 223, 224 (1980).
[Vol. 48
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and future advancement, is mainly dependent on the father; for
this he struggles and toils through life; the desire of its accom-
plishment operating as one of the most powerful incentives to in-
dustry and thrift. The violent abruption of this relationship
would not only tend to wither these motives to action, but neces-
sarily in time, alienate the father's natural affections; and if prop-
erty should be accumulated, the child under such circumstances
could hardly expect to inherit it."
By the twentieth century, the presumption of a mother's
rights to custody had replaced the presumption favoring the fa-
ther's rights. The "tender years" doctrine " recognized the theory
that, other things being equal, infants and young children were
best left to their mothers' care." Some courts continued to recog-
nize fathers as the preferred custodian for children who were of an
age to require education and preparation for labor or business.1"
However, judicial recognition and acceptance of the tender years
doctrine eventually enabled courts to routinely award permanent
custody to mothers."8
B. Sole Custody
For many years courts awarded sole custody to one of the par-
ents after a divorce.' 9 Sole custody consists of an award of custody
to one parent, usually the mother, with visitation rights to the
other parent.20 The parties may agree to modify the custody agree-
ment and share responsibilities for the children's care and deci-
sions about their lives to a limited extent. However, the custodial
parent makes the final decisions when the parties disagree.2 The
court usually orders, or the parties agree upon, a specific visitation
schedule for the non-custodial parent.22
Critics of sole custody with visitation have argued that award-
ing sole custody often does not serve the best interests of the
14. People ex rel. Nickerson, 19 Wend. 16, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
15. For a discussion of the "tender years" doctrine, see Comment, California's Pre-
sumption Favoring Joint Child Custody: California Civil Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 17
CAL. W. L. REV. 286 (1981).
16. Miller, supra note 2, at 352. See, e.g., REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) § 94-
4515(2). See also Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 176, 329 P.2d 225, 226 (1958).
17. Miller, supra note 2, at 352.
18. Id.
19. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 525-26.
20. See Miller, supra note 2, at 355.
21. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 526.
22. During visitations the non-custodial parent normally makes day-to-day decisions.
See Miller, supra note 2, at 360.
1987]
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child.23 For example, awarding sole custody to a mother does not
guarantee she will continue to be a full-time parent after the di-
vorce. This is especially true if she must work to support her chil-
dren because their father ignores his support obligations. 4 As one
commentator has noted, "the sole custody award often isolates
children from their fathers and forces mothers into the work
force. '2 5 Critics have also charged that sole custody awards often
turn children into pawns at the center of the divorce itself.26 In
many cases custody of children is the spoils of victory, because one
parent "wins" and the other "loses" the custody battle. These
critics conclude that sole custody may subordinate the best inter-
ests of the child to the interests of vindictive or hostile divorced
parents."'
C. The Effect of Sole Custody on Fathers
In many divorce cases, sole custody restricted the father's op-
portunity to remain an integral part of his children's lives. Fathers
were usually designated as non-custodial parents. Consequently,
many fathers' contact with their children after divorce was limited
to visits specified in the final divorce decrees. This undermined
their relationships with their children. 29
Moreover, courts often penalized fathers who sought custody
because fathers traditionally provided the family's financial sup-
port. Thus fathers were often rejected as custodial parents because
they spent so much time away from home, working to support the
children.30 On the other hand, fathers, as non-custodial parents,
were forced to relinquish their rights to participate in decisions
concerning their children's lives, decisions they were often bound
to accept. Some critics have suggested sole custody diminishes a
father's incentive to pay support payments.31
23. Bratt, supra note 3, at 274.
24. Id. at 274-75. See also Miller, supra note 2, at 356.
25. Bratt, supra note 3, at 274.
26. Miller, supra note 2, at 355-58.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Bratt, supra note 3, at 276.
31. See Montana Support Advisory Council; Child Support, Custody, and Visitation:
A Report to State Child Support Commissions (July, 1985).
[Vol. 48
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III. JOINT CUSTODY
A. The Nature of Joint Custody
In recent years, critics of sole custody have offered joint cus-
tody as an alternative to custody for one parent and visitation for
the other. Joint custody has also been called joint parenting, co-
custody, shared custody, or co-parenting.3 2 The Montana Child
Support Advisory Council refers to joint custody as "dual parent-
ing responsibility."33
Commentators who favor joint custody over sole custody with
visitation have argued that recent changes in American society re-
quire a reassessment of relationships between parents and chil-
dren. 4 Changes in women's roles, men's roles, and parents' roles
have combined to make sole custody and visitation arrangements
unacceptable in many cases.35 These commentators also argue joint
custody best recognizes these changes for divorced parents and
their children. Joint custody allows both parents to legally remain
influential in their children's lives. Proponents of joint custody
claim it offers a means to guarantee the parental rights of both
parents, and especially those of traditional non-custodial fathers.3"
They argue joint custody would allow and ultimately encourage fa-
thers to remain a vital part of their children's lives after divorce.
This concern is misplaced where it conflicts with or replaces the
best interests of the child.
Proponents of joint custody distinguish it from sole custody
and visitation because of the legal rights of both parents under
joint custody to affect their children's lives after divorce." These
rights, they argue, include reciprocal benefits for the children be-
cause they are able to maintain natural attachments with both par-
ents after divorce. 9 Joint custody is also distinguishable from two
other custody arrangements, divided custody and split custody.4"
Each alternative provides for different measures of parental con-
trol for different periods of time.
Divided custody allows parents to divide custodial responsibil-
ities between themselves. One parent has what amounts to sole
32. Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 528.
33. See Montana Support Advisory Council, supra note 31.
34. Bratt, supra note 3, at 276-80.
35. Id.
36. See Bratt, supra note 3, at 296-97.
37. Id.
38. Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 529.
39. Miller, supra note 2, at 362-363.
40. See id. at 360-361.
1987]
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custody for a specified period of time, while the other parent en-
joys visitation."' Then the parents switch roles; the visiting parent
becomes the custodian and vice versa. Often the parties will alter-
nate as custodian and visitor several times during a year.2
Split custody occurs when each parent has sole custody of dif-
ferent individual children.- In each case the non-custodial parent
may have visitation for the children whose custody he or she has
relinquished. Split custody can occur when divorced parents have
several children and each parent wants custody of at least one
child.
Courts have awarded divided or split custody if a case involves
circumstances that leave them no choice."" However, neither di-
vided nor split custody is commonly awarded in courts today.' In-
stead, courts have turned to joint custody arrangements as an al-
ternative to divided custody, split custody, or sole custody and
visitation.
B. The Elements of Joint Custody
In Beck v. Beck,' 7 the Supreme Court of New Jersey charac-
terized joint custody and distinguished it from divided or split cus-
tody in the following manner:
Properly analyzed, joint custody is comprised of two elements-
legal custody and physical custody. Under a joint custody ar-
rangement legal custody - the legal authority and responsibility
for making "major" decisions regarding the child's welfare - is
shared at all times by both parents. Physical custody, the logisti-
cal arrangement whereby the parents share the companionship of
the child and are responsible for "minor" day-to-day decisions,
may be alternated in accordance with the needs of the parties and
the children.'8
The trial court in Beck awarded joint custody sua sponte to
the divorced parents of two adopted children.4 9 The Appellate Di-
vision reversed and held for the wife, who had applied for sole cus-
41. Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 526.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 528.
44. See id.
45. See Annot., Comment Note- "Split," "divided," or "alternate" custody of chil-
dren 92 A.L.R.2D 695 (1963).
46. Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 526-528.
47. 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
48. Id. at 486-487, 432 A.2d at 65-66.
49. Id. at 489, 432 A.2d at 67.
[Vol. 48
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tody.5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate
Division and allowed the joint custody award.5 1 However, the court
remanded the case to the trial court for further fact finding be-
cause more than two years had passed since the original custody
award.2
The Beck court established several prerequisites to joint cus-
tody and applied those prerequisites to the facts of the case. For
joint legal custody, the court required a prior determination that
the children had established relationships with both parents which
would benefit from joint custody.53 The court also required both
parents to be physically and psychologically capable of fulfilling
their roles as parents, and willing to accept custody after divorce. 4
Finally, the court determined the parents must be able to put
aside their differences for the benefit of their children.55
For joint physical custody, the court considered "the financial
status of the parents, the proximity of their respective homes, the
demands of parental employment, and the age and number of the
children involved. ' '5 ' The court held that considering these factors,
the joint custody award was proper in this case.57 The court also
held that if joint custody was feasible on some if not all of these
considerations, it could include legal custody for both parents and
physical custody to one parent with visitation for the other.5 "
The court's analysis reflected its concern with the best inter-
ests of the children. The court considered many of the same ele-
ments Montana courts are required by statute to consider. 9 The
court also perceived the necessity of flexibility to accomodate indi-
vidual cases. In a strong dissent, Justice Sullivan argued joint cus-
tody could be appropriate under some circumstances. He was un-
willing to concede, however, that joint custody was "the 'preferred
disposition' in custody cases, as the majority opinion, despite some
restrictive language, seems to suggest."60 Sullivan was concerned
that joint custody would be used to replace sole custody in child
custody dispositions. He was also unwilling to concede that the
best interests of the children were realized by awarding joint cus-
50. Id. at 494, 432 A.2d at 69.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 501-502, 432 A.2d at 73.
53. Id. at 497-498, 432 A.2d at 71.
54. Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 72.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 500, 432 A.2d at 72.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 500, 432 A.2d at 72-73.
59. See infra note 68.
60. Id. at 502, 432 A.2d at 73 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
1987]
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tody in this case. 1
C. The Best Interests of the Child
The Beck court analyzed the factors involved in the joint cus-
tody award in terms of the best interests of the children.6 2 This
standard for awarding custody developed through case law. 3 In
many jurisdictions, like Montana, the best interests standard is
also controlled by statute."4
The best interests standard has been characterized as a gen-
eral approach to custody decisions rather than a fixed formula for
awarding custody.6 It requires courts to consider the psychologi-
cal, economic, and social factors present in each case. Because of
the diverse facts of each case-coming before the courts, "there can
be no one custody arrangement which is, as a matter of law, in the
best interests of the child."66 On the other hand, skeptics contend
the standard is merely a cloak for judicial discretion and
intuition.6 7
Montana courts have applied the best interests standard to
determine the appropriateness of custody awards. Section 40-4-212
of the Montana Code Annotated lists five factors that the court
shall consider: the parents' wishes, the child's wishes, the child's
interaction with others in his world, the child's adjustment to his
environment, and the physical and mental health of everyone in-
volved.68 The best interests of the child is also the standard used
61. Id.
62. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 501, 432 A.2d 63, 72.
63. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 532.
The enunciation of the "best interests test" is usually credited to Justice Brewer
in an 1881 Kansas decision which awarded custody of a 5-year-old girl to her
grandmother who had raised her rather than to her father. The judge wrote that
though the father had a natural right to custody, the paramount consideration was
the welfare of the child.
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Bratt, supra note 3, at 287.
67. Miller, supra note 2, at 354.
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1985) states:
Best interest of the child. The court shall determine custody in accordance with
the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or par-
ents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
[Vol. 48
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for awarding joint custody.
IV. JOINT CUSTODY IN MONTANA
In Montana, courts must also use the "best interests" test to
overcome the presumption under Montana law that, upon applica-
tion of one parent, joint custody is in the best interests of the
child. 9 Courts must use the "best interest" test if they want to
avoid joint custody. But because the presumption is statutory,
Montana courts are called upon to justify awarding or denying
joint custody in all cases where one party applies.70 The courts and
not the parties must overcome the presumption when they deny
joint custody.
Another significant difference between joint, divided, and split
custody arises when joint custody is accompanied by a presump-
tion that it is in the best interests of the child to award joint cus-
tody. At first, joint custody was encouraged primarily as a volun-
tary alternative arrangement for "relatively stable, amicable
parents behaving in a mature, civilized fashion. ' 1 But in Montana,
the joint custody statutes include a presumption favoring joint cus-
tody in all cases where at least one party applies. Add to this pre-
sumption a broad judicial discretion to determine custody arrange-
ments, like the Beck court exercised, and joint custody takes on a
life of its own.
A. Montana's Joint Custody Statutes
In 1981, Montana joined a growing number of states which
had passed laws allowing joint custody of children for divorced
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224 (1985).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-223 (1985) states:
Award of joint or separate custody.
(1) In custody disputes involving both parents of a minor child, the court
shall award custody according to the best interests of the child as set out in 40-4-
212:
(a) to both parents jointly; the court shall inquire whether a joint custody
agreement was made knowingly and voluntarily; or
(b) to either parent. In making an award to either parent, the court shall
consider, along with the factors set out in 40-4-212, which parent is more likely to
allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent and
may not prefer a parent as custodian because of the parent's sex.
(2) In making an award, the court shall require the submission of a plan for
the implementation of the custody order.
(3) In making an award, the court shall state in its decision the reasons and
factors considered in making the award.
71. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 585, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451, 378 N.E. 2d 1019,
1021 (N.Y., 1978).
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parents. The joint custody statutes were part of a national re-
sponse to common concerns loosely termed "fathers' rights.17 2
One commentator has also observed that in states which have en-
acted constitutional guarantees of equal protection, an unques-
tioned preference for awarding custody to mothers has been elimi-
nated.73  The Montana Constitution of 1972 contains an equal
protection provision in Article II, sec. 4.
Section 40-4-222 of Montana Code Annotated is the declara-
tion of legislative intent for joint custody.75 Section 40-4-223 of
Montana Code Annotated provides the standard for determining
whether courts should award joint or sole custody in a given case.76
The latter statute requires that a custody arrangement accord with
the best interests of the child. If a judge concludes joint custody
passes the "best interests" test, he or she may award custody of
the children to the parties jointly.77
B. Montana Case Law on Joint Custody
The Montana Supreme Court cases in which joint custody is
an issue usually involve a party trying to modify an existing joint
custody arrangement.7 8 When the Montana Supreme Court consid-
ers modification of a custody award, Montana's modification stat-
ute requires it to consider the modification in terms of the best
interests of the child in each case." Many cases involve attempts
to modify joint custody awards in favor of sole custody with visita-
tion. However, in these cases, the court has declined to consider
any presumption that joint custody was in the best interests of the
child when it was originally awarded.
72. See generally Folberg, supra note 6, at 533-536.
73. Robbins, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the Development of Judicial Standards,
48 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 107 (1979). See also Bratt, supra note 3, at 288.
74. MONT. CONST. art. II, sec. 4. See also Miller, supra note 2, at 410.
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-222 states:
Declaration of legislative intent-joint custody. The legislature of the state of
Montana finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure mi-
nor children frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents
have separated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the
rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy. The legis-
lature believes that the district courts of the state of Montana have the authority
to award joint custody if the court finds joint custody in the best interests of the
children in the case then before the court. The intent of 40-4-222 through 40-4-
225 is to establish certain guidelines for resolution of custody disputes.
76. See supra note 70.
77. Id.
78. See In Re B.T.S., - Mont. -, 712 P.2d 1298 (1985).
79. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219 (1985).
144 [Vol. 48
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In Quinn v. Quinn,80 a district court disallowed a modification
of a decree of dissolution which included joint custody of the par-
ties' children.81 The mother had asked the court to terminate the
father's joint custody of the parties' children. 82 He argued the de-
cree gave him sole custody of the children and he responded with
an order to hold her in contempt of court for violating the agree-
ment. The district court held for the father and the mother ap-
pealed. The court held that the language in the dissolution decree
clearly anticipated joint custody. However, the court reversed the
district court and remanded the case for further hearings to deter-
mine whether joint custody was in the best interests of the
children.8"
In Quinn, the Montana Supreme Court found joint custody in
the language of the final decree of dissolution but declined to de-
cide whether that arrangement was in the best interests of the par-
ties' children. 84 However, the language of the opinion was not with-
out direction. The court stated:
We recognize there are advantages in the joint custody alternative
to the single parent custody/non-custodial parent visitation ar-
rangement, but there are also important disadvantages to this al-
ternative. In this case, for example, with the parents living a dis-
tance apart, the joint custody arrangement appears only to be
fostering antagonism (between the parties) and instability in the
children's home environment.85
Although the court recognized advantages of joint custody, it was
unwilling to concede that the original joint custody award could be
presumed to be in the best interests of the children in this case.
In other cases, the Montana Supreme Court has considered
whether to modify from a sole custody to a joint custody award. In
Cameron v. Cameron,8 6 a district court granted a mother's petition
for divorce but awarded custody of the parties' three-year-old son
to his father. The boy had lived with his mother since the parties'
separation. In Cameron, the parties had agreed to joint custody
but could not agree on mutually satisfactory arrangements. The
mother appealed the lower court's custody determination. 87 The
Montana Supreme Court remanded the case for further findings
80. - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 230 (1981).
81. Id. at __, 622 P.2d at 232.
82. Id.
83. Id. at -, 622 P.2d at 232-233.
84. See id. at -, 622 P.2d at 233.
85. Id.
86. 197 Mont. 226, 614 P.2d 1057 (1982).
87. Id. at 231, 614 P.2d at 1060.
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and conclusions because the district court did not record the essen-
tial and determining facts upon which its conclusion rested, so the
judgment lacked support.8 8 The court did not approve of awarding
sole custody to the father. Instead, it remanded the case and re-
fused to allow the lower court to award anything other than joint
custody without justification. In this case, the court again recog-
nized the advantages of joint custody but was unwilling to con-
clude without further facts that it would be in the best interest of
the child.89
In Schuman v. Bestrom,90 the court affirmed a trial court's
custody determination in favor of the mother based on the Uni-
form Parentage Act instead of the "best interests of the child"
test.9 The court reasoned that both statutes lead to the same re-
sult because both are "bottomed" in the "best interests" test.
Thus, the court denied the father's claim that the district court's
holding deprived him of the equal protection of the laws.92
In Schuman the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to
modify the sole custody awarded the mother simply because the
father had requested a modification of joint custody. The court de-
clined to consider the presumption that joint custody was in the
best interests of the child, which would have changed the outcome.
In some cases, the court has affirmed a lower court's refusal to
award joint custody in spite of the presumption. These cases raise
questions about the relationship between the presumption that
joint custody is in the best interests of the child and the applica-
tion of the best interests standard to individual awards.
In Nalivka v. Nalivka,93 the court affirmed a lower court's de-
cision to reject joint custody. The court held the lower court had
fulfilled statutory requirements by explaining why it denied the
parties' request for joint custody of their children. 4 In Nalivka,
the court interpreted the requirements of Section 40-4-224(1) of
Montana Code Annotated. The court held that the lower court ap-
plied the "best interests of the child" test and concluded in this
case joint custody failed the test.98 The lower court had also pro-
88. Id.
89. But see Paradis v. Paradis, - Mont. ., 689 P.2d 1263 (1984), where the
court vacated a trial court's decision to leave a child with his father and reinstated the joint
custody from the divorce decree.
90. Mont.., 693 P.2d 536 (1985).
91. Id. at 539.
92. Id. at 540.
93. - Mont. - 720 P.2d 683 (1986).
94. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 686.
95. Id.
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vided a detailed list of reasons for its decision. The Montana Su-
preme Court found no error in the lower court's determination.
In Bergner v. Owens,9 the court affirmed a district court's
modification of a joint custody award. The trial judge considered
the best interests of the children and granted the father sole cus-
tody with visitation for the mother.9 7 In Bergner, the court held
the trial judge had considered all the factors in the "best interests"
test and therefore correctly modified the custody award in the dis-
solution petition.
In some cases, the Montana Supreme Court has gone beyond
the best interests standard for custody awards. In In re B.T.S.,98
the Montana Supreme Court added a new criteria for awarding
joint custody.9 9 B.T.S. contained unusual facts. The child at the
center of the dispute was conceived before the marriage was dis-
solved and born after the final decree of dissolution. The parties
did not know the mother was pregnant at the time. The lower
court granted the father joint custody and the child's mother
appealed. 10
The court decided that because the father was absent from the
child since its birth, the "best interests" test from Sections 40-4-
222 and -223 of Montana Code Annotated was insufficient criteria
upon which to base an award of joint custody. 101 The court re-
versed the district court and required further specific findings
about the father's capability and willingness to care for the child
before he would be awarded joint custody.102 The B.T.S. court sub-
ordinated the presumption that the father's application for joint
custody meant it would be in the child's best interests. The pre-
sumption was subordinated to the best interests standard applied
to the particular facts.
In Gahm v. Henson,'0 3 the court added a further development
to joint custody in Montana. In Gahm, the court affirmed a lower
court's refusal to modify a joint custody decree.1 04 The court held
that modification or petition to terminate joint custody should be
denied unless the moving party could demonstrate "serious endan-
96. - Mont. ., 722 P.2d 1141 (1986).
97. Id.
98. - Mont. , 712 P.2d 1298 (1985).
99. See id.
100. Id. at - , 712 P.2d at 1299.
101. See id. at 712 P.2d at 1301.
102. See id. at -, 712 P.2d at 1303.
103. - Mont. -, 722 P.2d 1138 (1986).
104. Id. at - , 722 P.2d at 1141.
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germent of the child."' 5 The trial court found, and the supreme
court agreed, that no such endangerment was evidenced by the
facts of the case.106
V. CONCLUSION
Montana's joint custody statutes have proven much less suc-
cessful in realizing policy goals than supporters imagined. It is
clear that despite the advantages of joint custody, it is not for ev-
eryone.10 7 Careful consideration of the facts of each case will help
courts determine whether to award joint custody, considering the
best interests of the children involved. For the most part, this is
how the Montana Supreme Court has decided and should continue
to decide custody awards cases. 10 8 It has ignored the statutory pre-
sumption and applied the best interests standard directly to the
facts of the case. While it is true that most of the custody cases
before the Montana Supreme Court have involved modification of
existing custody awards, there is nothing to indicate those cases
would have been decided differently if the appeal was based on the
presumption in the joint custody statute.
It is uncertain whether the presumption would survive a court
challenge. Before that happens, however, the Montana legislature
should remove the presumption from the statute. The presumption
supports a father's rights to custody and counters the "tender
years" doctrine favoring mothers. The statute merely substitutes
one presumption for another. In fact, neither presumption should
control custody awards. Indeed, a presumption on either side may
give judges an excuse to avoid difficult decisions in custody awards
cases. Removing the statutory presumption and allowing joint cus-
tody awards only upon application of both parties would still re-
quire courts to apply the best interests standard to determine cus-
tody awards. It would also remove a means for abusive or
manipulative spouses to continue to exert control after divorce, us-
ing the threat of application for joint custody to gain leverage on
other issues.
The case law on joint custody is inconsistent. However, if
courts continue to ignore the presumption and apply the best in-
terests standards directly to individual cases, a coherent body of
105. Id. at -, 722 P.2d at 1140.
106. Id. at -, 722 P.2d at 1141.
107. Even supporters of joint custody concede that it is not for everyone, nor applica-
ble to every custody case. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 6, at 576; Miller, supra note 2,
at 403; Bratt, supra note 3, at 303.
108. See Ward v. Ward, __ Mont. , P.2d - , 43 St. Rptr. 1825 (1986).
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case law could quickly develop. Practicing attorneys should remain
sensitive to the possibility that their individual cases, if properly
appealed, could facilitate this development.
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